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Summary
This paper proposes a technique to generate a public
cryptographic key from user,s voice while speaking over a
handheld device. Making use of the human intelligence to
identi$/au:henticate the voice of the speaker and therefore use
the voice as the public key. The generated public key is used to
encrypt of the transferred data over the open communication
channel. The implementation of such a system on mobile phones
resist any eavesdrop on phone calls, even from the service
provider itself. The proposed protocol also eliminates the need
for a trusted third party. This work first analyzes the impact of
using RSA and Difiie-Hellman as public key cryptographic
methods with RC4 stream cipher as the proposed protocol. Then,
the processing steps for the speakeds signal which is used to
produce the public key. Fiaally the study proposed the use of
RSA, Diffie-Hellman and RC4 algorithms in the proposed
il:::t 
to secure the communication between rwo mobile phone
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l. Introduction
Most mobile phones were poor in security. One of the
problems with these models is scanning, which means that
third parties in the local area could intercept and
eavesdrop in phone calls. This is especially true in
analogue mobile phones were it is easy to eavesdrop by
using radio scanners. More recent digital systems such as
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) have
tried to resolve these fundamental issues; however security
problems still continue to persist. GSM uses various
cryptographic algorithms for communication security such
as A5/l and A5/2. The A5l1 and A5/2 stream ciphers are
used to provide over-the-air voice privacy in cellular
telephone standard. A5il was developed first and used
within Europe and the United States. A5/2 is weaker than
A5ll which is used in countries that may not be able to
support the infrastructure necessary for A5/1. Both
algorithms have been recently cracked Il].
This paper proposes a new solution to secure mobile
phone conversation by doing the encryption and
decryption process on the caller and the calle sides.
regardless of the cryptographic algorithm used by the local
network. By using this approach the user can avoid the
attacker from listening or intercepting to the voice calls. In
this paper RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DID and RC4
cryptosystems will be used to ensure the security of the
communication channel. The keys here are divided into
public key and private key. Public key is generated from
the speaker voice and the corresponding private key will
be considered as the DH private key. A shared secret will
be calculated to generate the input key for the RC4. RC4
algorithm will generate a key-stream to complete tle
encryption and decryption process.
Using speaker speech to generate the public key and
further used in encryption is an area of great promise for
security applications, the implementation of such a system
on mobile phones presents its own unique challenges.
These challenges can be identified as enyironmental
conditions, microphone variability and mobile phones
computational limitation.
While the task of securing the communication
channels for the mobile phones has been a topic of
substantial research, much of the work has been centered
on securing the local network. This research departs from
securing the channel between users by generating the
cryptographic public key as they speak. This paper is
organized as follows: In Section 2, we analyze the impact
of RSA and DH as public key cryptographic methods and
RC4 as stream cipher. Then, Section 3 provides an
overview of a basic technique for speaker recognition.
Next in Section 4, we describe the proposed framework
from capturing the speaker utterance, generating the
cryptographic keys and securing the communication
channel. Finally, in Section 5 we show our results and
draws together concluding remarks on the research project
with the future work.
2. Cryptography
Public-Key cryptography is the science of using
mathematics to encrypt and decrypt information. With
cryptogaphy storing or hansmitting sensitive information
becomes safer across insecure networks like the Internet.
Cryptographic techniques are divided into two generic
types: Symmetric key and Asymmetric key. Symmetric
key is a conventional type of crpto$aphy which is also
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known as secret key cryptography l2l.The same key is
used for encryption and decryption process' Examples of
the symmetric key cryptosystems are Data Encryption
Standard (DES), Triple DES and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). Speed of computations in the symmetric
key algorithms is an advantage, compared to asymmetric
key algorithms. Asymmetric key algorithms which give an
altemative way of securing data require a huge amount of
time to do the computation for encryption and decryption'
Public key cryptography was introduced by Whitfield
Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1975 [3]. The term public
key cryptogpaphy is a synonym for asymmetric key
cryptography. Public keys have two separate keys that are
mathematically connected, a public key which encrypts
data, and a related private key for decryption. Public key is
published to the public while the private key is being kept
secretly. Some examples for public key cryptosystems are
Elgamal, RSA, DH, and Elliptical Curve Cryptography [2].
2.I RSA
This is probably the most recognizable asymmetric
algorithm. RSA was created by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir,
and Leonard Adleman n 1977 [a]. To date, it is the only
asymmetric algorithm in widespread use that is used for
private/public key generation and encryption. The
operation of the RSA is described with tull details in [5].
Two mathematical problems play the important de
for the RSA cryptosystem [6]: the problem of factoring
very large numbers, and the RSA problem. The integer
factorization problem is the problem of fmding a non-
trivial factor of a composite almost prime number. When
these numbers are very large, it becomes difficult to
factonze and till now no efficient algorithm is known to
factor these huge almost prime numbers. The RSA
problem is simply the task of taking e-th roots modulo a
composite n, trying to get the plaintext z such that me:c
mod n, where the RSA public key is e, and r. An attacker
needs to factor n into p and 4, and computes (p-l)(q-|)
which allows the determination of d from e.
Key distribution in RSA like other cipher algorithms
needs to be secured against man-in-the-middle attack. The
attacker can give a false identity to both sides, if the
attacker intercepts the transmissions between the caller
and the calle. None of the parties will be able to detect the
attacker presence. Defenses against such attacks are often
based on digital certificates or other components of a
public key infrastructure.
2.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
The concept of DH key exchange is commonly known as
DH. DH represents the last names of the inventors
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. The method was
introduced n 1976, and it was the first practical method
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for agreeing on a shared secret key based on a secure key-
exchange protocol over an unsecured communications
channel. DH is not an encryption method rather than it is a
key exchange protocol. In [6] full details on how the DH
concept works is presented.
DH generates a secret number just for one bansaction.
This is called a session key or a symmetric key. As
mentioned before, all asymmetric key systems are
considered slow. If little amount of data is being
exchanged, the shared secret may be used to encrypt the
actual data. But when a huge amount of data is to be
passed between both sides, just like in case of phone
conversation, encryption requires a stream cipher system
such as A5ll, ASl2, FISH, SEAL or RC4. RC4 is the
mostly used stream cipher in such applications.
The security of the DH cryptosystem depends on the
discrete logarithm problem. The protocol assumes that it is
computationally infeasible to calculate the shared secret
key, K = gx.,x' mod n , iven the two public values
(g" rnod z) and (g'" 
-od ,) where z is a suffrciently
large prime.
Breaking DH protocol is equivalent to calculate
discrete logarithms under certain assumptions as what
Maurer has showed in t7l. The DH key exchange is
vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle atiack [6]. ln this attack,
an attacker is placed between Alice and Bob. Alice and
Bob will be used as a conventional terms referring to
common characters used in cryptography field. The
attacker fools Bob by sending his public key to Bob
instead of Alice public key. Bob will transmit his public
key. Whereby, the attacker will change it with his public
key and sends it to Alice. At this stage, tle attacker and
Alice will agree on a secret key. On the other hand, the
attacker and Bob will agree on another secret key. After
this exchange, the attacker simply decrypts any messages
sent out by Alice or Bob, and then the attacker is able to
read, insert and modifu them before encrypting again with
the other party public key. This vulnerability is present
because DH does not authenticate the participants.
2.3FiC4 Stream Cipher
RC4 is the most widely used stream cipher designed
in 1987 by Ron Rivest for RSA Security [6]. It is a
variable key size stream cipher with byte-oriented
operations. The algorithm is based on the use of random
permutations. RC4 is a very fast stream cipher and it is
used in the SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport
Layer Secwity) standards that used in the WEP (Wired
Equivalent Privacy) protocol. Full detail on how RC4
works can be found in [6]. The encryption is done by
applying XOR operation on a byte of the plaintext with
one byte of the key-stream. Decryption process is the same
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to the encryption process but the same key-stream byte is
XORed wi& the ciphertext instead.
Many approaches tried to attack RC4 but none of
these approaches is practical against RC4 with large key
length such as 128 bits or more [8]. Therefore, up to now
RC4 is considered as a secure stream cipher.
3. Speech Recognition
Biometrics uses biological information to verify the
identity of a person [9]. Biometric recognition methods
include: fingerprint scan, retina scan, face scan, and voice
recognition. The choice ofvoice recognition against others
is made because most of biometric techniques need
complex equipments, and also some of these techniques
need the physical presence of the person such as
fingerprint and retina scanning. However, voice
recognition can be done remotely like in the case of
phones, giving more flexibility when dealing with the
phone.
In order Jo understand how speaker recognition
works, we need to understand how voice is produced [9].
Voice is simply created when air passes the larynx or other
parts of the vocal tract. The vibration of the larynx creates
an acoustic wave, especially the hum sound. This wave is
modified by the motion of the palate, tongue and lips.
There are also other sounds that are created by other parts
of the vocal tract. The unique voice pattems which are
produced by individuals depend on two factors:
physiological and behavioral characteristics.
The digitizing process of the human voice begins
from the voice produced by the human. The voice is an
analogue signal. Analogue signal means continuous values
within a time range. The analogue signal is converted into
an electrical wave or digital signal, by using devices such
as microphone. Next, the continuous digital signals are
converted into a discrete voltage values. This process is
called sampling. Sampling measures the voltage of the
signal at regular time intervals.
At the highest level, all speaker recognition systems
contain two main modules: Template Matching and
Feature Extraction [10]. Template Matching is the simpler
and the most accurate on some cases. It works by
comparing the digitized voice with the digitized template
based on the amplitude of the voice signal over many
frequencies at various times over the entire period of the
identification process. But Template Matching does not
distinguish between the speech and the background noise.
So if the registration is done with noise, the recognition
process must be done with the same background noise
again.
Feature Extraction does not really use any
characteristics of the speech; it takes the digitized signal
and applies it to mathematical techniques to produce the
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results. These results do not describe the voice in physical
terms but they can be used to identif the speaker voice.
Feature Extraction is much better to identifr the speaker
than Template Matching with weak signal strength and
background noise, due to the mathematical techniques
which isolates the mathematical features from the speech.
Hence Feature Extraction is prefened more than Template
Matching in comparing voiceprints, and it is implemented
in the majority of voice identification systems.
3.1 Speech Feature Extraction
The aim of this module is to take the speech waveform and
convert it to some type of parametric representation for
further analysis and processing. This process is called the
signal-processing front end. A variety ofpossibilities can
be chosen to perform Feature Extraction on the speech
signal to recognize a speaker, such as Linear Prediction
Coding (LPC) [ l], Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients(MFCC) [11], and others. MFCC is the best known and
widely used.
3.2 Mel-frequency Cepstrum Coefficients
MFCC main purpose is to perform the same frmctionality
of the human ears [ 1]. MFCC processor structure is
illustrated in Fig. I using block diagram. Each step is
discussed in [2]. Typically the speech recording is done
at a sampling rate above 10000 Hz. This sampling
frequency was chosen to reduce the effects of aliasing in
the analog-to-digital conversion. Furthermore, these
sampled signals have the ability to capture all frequencies
up to 5 kHz, which cover most energy of sounds that are
generated by humans.
Fig. I Block Diagram for MFCC [12].
4. Software Based Voice Encryption Systems
There are many voice encryption systems available. Most
of these cryptosystems make PC-to-PC phone calls and
they are free for downloading like PGPFone [13], Nautilus
[1a] and Speak Freely [5]. PGPFone has a user friendly
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interface and uses a selection of encryption schemes, such
as 128 bit CAST key, 168 bit Triple-DES key or 192 bit
Blowfish key. Nautilus depends mainly on DH Key
Exchange. Speak Freely uses IDEA or DES. Other
cryptosystems like Digital Voice Protection (DVP)' STU
III (Secure Telephone Unit, Generation III) and STE are
hardware based encryption systems and they are not
designed for PDA's or advanced cellular phones.
There are cryptosystems that secure cellular
telecommunication over the GSM network, such as
Snapshield [16] and CryptoPhone [17]. Snapshield has
developed Snapcell, a plug-in cellular encryption unit to
which it secures end-to-end GSM communications' The
problem with Snapcell is that it uses hardware unit which
must be installed on the mobile phone and above that, this
hardware unit can support only some models of Ericsson
and Sony mobile phones. Snapshield uses DH key
exchange with AES to secure the channel. Snapshield did
not publish the blue print of their design, in which there
might be back doors for their algorithm. Furthermore, the
attached unit also shortens the mobile phone battery life
time.
On the other hand, CryptoPhone was designed by
GSMK CryptoPhones Company [17]. CryptoPhone takes
the advantage of the high processing performance of
recently available PDAs and mobile phones to do real-
time voice encryption. Unlike other products in the market
CryptoPhone gave the details of their inner workings. The
problem with this design is that it can be attacked by man-
in-the-middle attack as mentioned previously in DH.
Attacker can give to both sides his public key and wait
them to send their public keys, which enables him to
generate two shared secret keys. The attacker can now
analyze the transmifted signal and may listen to the
conversation. This problem occurs because both sides
cannot authenticate each other before start transmitting.
CryptoPhone solved this problem by showing six digits
key on caller and calle mobile phones. Whereby, both
sides need to speak three marked digits from the six digits
shown. The caller will speak his three digits and the calle
will check if they match with the digits shown on his
mobile phone. The calle speak the other three digits and
the caller check if they match with the shown digits in
order to authenticate each other.
5. Methodology
Equipped with the background described in the previous
sections, this section gives an overview for the
methodology used to derive a cryptographic key from the
user speech. The proposed methodology begins with
capturing the speaker's utterance, dividing the voice
samples of the utterance into overlapping windows, and
deriving the user's key from the cepstrum coefficients
using a feature descriptor. This procedure enables the
users authenticate each other by hearing each other voice
and generating each other public key.
The next goal after this processing is to construct a
long enough cryptographic key for each speaker. This key
is the speaker's public key. Our proposed method
authenticates the user's public key values which makes
this methodology immune to man-inthe-middle attack
unlike today's available products as have been discussed
before. This methodology further discuss the generation of
the user's private key and the generation ofthe session key
which is used as an input for producing a keysteam to
encrypt and decrypt information in real-time. Generating
the private key is done iteratively in this proposed
methodology until finding a suitable private key to be used.
The following subsections cover in detail the description
ofthese steps.
5.1 Speech Processing
Our proposed methodology begins with capnring the
speaker utterance and turns it into a sequence of MFCC
(acoustic vectors) using MFCC speech processing steps.
Continuous speech signal is blocked into frames of N
samples, with adjacent frames being separatedby M (M <
M). The number of samples taken per frame is 256 (N =
256) which is appropriate number to avoid aliasing. The
distance between frames is 100 (M: 100). After cutting
the speech signal into frames with overlap, the outcome is
a matrix where each column is a frame of N samples from
original speech sigrral. Next we employ Windowing and
FFT processing steps to transform the signal from time
domain into the frequency domain. The result is called the
single's power spectrum. These processes together can be
referred as Windowed Fourier Transform (WFT). Finally,
the power spectrum resulted from WFT process is
converted into mel-frequency cepstrum coefficients after
using one filter bank for each desired mel-frequency
component.
5.2 Mapping Frames to Features
Having derived the acoustic vectors with N ftames, the
main target now is to define features of these frames that
are exactly the same when the same user speaks the same
utterance. From these features, an m-bit feature descriptor
is then derived. The approach introduced here isolates one
feature in each data vector and generates one descriptor bit
from each feature, so each data vector can be used as one
bit, N = m, even though this may not be necessary;
because multiple data vectors could be used to derive one
bit. so that.l/> m.
The feature used to generate the feature descriptor 6
from the data vectors l/(l) ... Z(N) depends on the
44
IJCSNS Intemational Joumal of Computer Science and Network Securify, VOLJ No.3, March 2007
amplitude values of the data vectors. In this approach the
i-th feature 6 -g if the amplitude value is negative, Q, *1
otherwise. To map these features to a feature descriptor,
simply we need to test whether each feature is positive or
negative. See Eq.(l)
Urn ={o if anplinde value <o (l)' | | Otherwise
The value D(l represents the position relative to the origin
plane, so the value of 0 can be interpreted as the data
vector value falls under the origin plane, while b(i)
indicates that data vector falls on the plane itself or the
positive side of the plane. At the end, the complete b(i)
represents the public key in binary digits; it is
recommended to have a very long key. If the public key
was not a prime number the next prime number will be
taken as the public key. This method has the flexibility to
choose a variable key length. There are many several
features that can be implemented to generate the feature
descriptor.
5.3 Generating Keys, Encryption and Decryption
Flow
At this stage we have derived the speaker's public key
noted by b(i). This public key is further used to generate
the corresponding RSA private key. After that, the RSA
private key will be used as the DH private key. The
corresponding DH public key will be calculated and
exchanged in a secure manner. The DH public key will be
encrypted using RSA algorithm and transferred to the
other side. At this step, each part has the other's DH
public key after decrypting it using each one's RSA
private key.
Now both users can compute the secret key by
completing DH key exchange algorithm. The result is the
same secret key for both sides; this secret kev is used onlv
for one communication session. Next, having the sharei
secret key in hand, the key will be used as the key for the
RC4 sheam cipher algorithm. RC4 stream cipher will start
to produce a keystream; the keystream will be the same for
both sides. This keystream will be used for doing nvo
operations; encrypting the speaker voice and messages,
and decrypting the received information from the other
speaker. The process of generating these keys is next
discussed in detail. Fig. 2 illustrates the encryption flow.
Two large random and distinct primesp and 4 needed
to be generated for each session; compute (n = pq), the
Euler totient function p(n) : (p - t)(q - I) and selecting a
random integer e, I < e < qfu), suchthat gcd(e, p(n)) = L
We notice that e which is the public key is already
known and is generated in a separate manner from
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generating qfu). To generate the RSA private key the
following steps are performed:
(D Generate two large random and distinct primes p and
q, each roughly the same size.(ii) Compute (n : pq) and the totient tunction p(n) : ( p -
I)(q - 1)(iii) Check the public key e with g(n) suchthat
gcd(e, d : l' If this condition is achieved then move
on to step 4, else go back to step l.(iv) Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the
unique integer d, I < d < g(n), such that
ed= I (modpfu).(v) Share (n, e), andkeep private key d.
This process is secure against any attacks on private
keys; because the key space g(n) and the private key d will
be changed for each session, so it is hard to factoize p(n)
or even trying to figure out d.
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Fig.2 Encryption Flow.
Next, the RSA private key obtained above will be
considered as the DH private key and another process will
start to generate a secret key for both useni as follows:
(t The two global integers z and g are fixed and known
by each user.(ii) The user's DH private key here is the RSA private
key which has been already computed. So Alice,s
privatekeyis X, =6r,whileBob'sis Xs =da.(iii) From n, g and X, each part computes his own DH
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public k"y, Yn = gx' modn for Alice and
Y, = gxu modz for Bob.
(iv) Both users exchange their DH public keys after
encrypting them with RSA public keys.(v) Inorder to get the secret key or session key, each
users decrypt the DH public key. Here, Alice will
compute K=Y"" modz to get the secret key and
Bob will compute K=Yn*" modz to get the same
secret key.
Finally, after setting up the secret keys by both sides,
each user uses the secret key as the RC4 input key and
starts generating a keystream. This keystream is used to
perform encryption by simply performing XOR operation
for the out going data, and the same keystream will be
used to decrypt the incoming data for each side by doing
XOR operation. Decryption is simply done by XORing the
keystream with the encrypted data stream to get the
original data stream as illustrated in Fig. 3. XOR operation
is not computationally expensive for today's mobile
phones. Now the communication channel is secured' even
if communication gets tapped, what an eavesdropper gets
is nonsense.
The audio stream can be applied to pre-processing
steps before doing encryption. That is encode the audio
stream before doing encryption and decodes the audio
stream after decryption to get the original audio stream.
This process analogically like putting the audio streams in
a secure envelops.
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6. Results
This section presents the results for the proposed
methodology adopted in Section 5. This section also
discusses the obtained results from implementing the
system. In order to implement such a system, one must go
through several steps which were described in details in
previous sections. The implementation for this simulated
project is written using MATLAB. In addition, Maple 8
kernel access was used in programming.
Some tests have been done to measure in which
degree the final result can work under personal computers
and somewhat mobile phones (e.g. PC-to-PC, Mobile-to-
Mobile and Mobile-to-PC). These tests were performed on
the following specifications: Intel(R) Pentium(R) M
processor l.73GHz,512 MB RAM of memory, Microsoft
Windows XP Home Edition and programming language
was MATLAB.
Testing was also done on the same PC but with
different processor speed. The processor speed has been
reduced to reach 412 MHz which is near to or less than
recent mobile phones. Some of the available mobile
phones are currently: Dell Axim X30 powered with Intel
624MHz XScale processor, with 64MB RAM and 64MB
ROM. Samsung ARM9-based 53C2440, is clocked at
533MHz.
In this project, a standard microphone connected with
the PC is used as the hardware for speech recording. The
standard sound recorder program in Microsoft Windows is
used to do speech recording. The audio format settings are
PCM 44.100 kllz, 16 bit and stereo. This is even more
than what GSM uses now which is 8000 kHz, 8 bit mono;
that means less computation time needed than PCM
214.100 kLlz, 16 bit and stereo. The speaker speech is
recorded and saved in wave format.
The timing results for this cryptosystem are computed
and presented in the same order of execution. First of all,
Key setup starting from the MFCC processing. Table I
shows the result of executing MFCC algorithm for
different audio speech lengths to get 64 acoustic vectors.
The key generated from these acoustic vectors is 64-bit
length. Note that these audio files were stored on the hard
drive and MFCC function needs the same execution time
for a variable audio file length.
Table I also shows the storage required to save the
audio files. On the other han4 Table II shows the timing
results for executing MFCC algorithm for different
acoustic vector sizes. A larger vector size needs more
computation time. A 64 acoustic vector can generate from
64-bit public key up to 2048-bit public key.
Fig.3 Decryption Flow.
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Table l: Time in seconds 1o generate 64 Acoustic Vecton from MFCC
for different
Audio length
in seconds
Time for MFCC
on P 1.7 GHz
Time for MFCC
on P 412
MHz
Required
Storage
0.0156 0.0313 I80 KB
2 0.0156 0.0313 356 KB
J 0.0 t 56 0.0313 527 KB
207
Table 2 shows different key sizes after applying the
feature descriptor on the acoustic vectors resulted from
MFCC process. The process for generating RSA private
key and checking the primality of the public key is placed
next.
Table 3 shows average timing rosults for generating
RSA keys for variable key sizes. The average time is done
using ten tests for each key size.
From Table 3, it is obvious that using 64-bit long
RSA keys is very fast. In the sense of security, a 64-bit
key is secure enough to transfer public DH keys. After
RSA keys have been computed, DH key exchange comes
next. DH function first computes the corresponding
private key. Secondly, it computes the second user public
key. Finally, exchange the key using RSA and computes
secret shared key. Table 4 shows the timing result to
generate the secret key.
When the secret key is known, the key is used as RC4
key. Table 5 shows the time required to initialize RC4.
Table 5: Time needed to
Time in seconds on P 1.7 GHz Time in seconds on P 412 MHz
0.0006 0.0056
Finally, the encryption process will start. Encryption
tests were done and the timing results were taken for either
doing XOR operation alone, or encoding and then doing
XOR operation over bytes of data. Timing tests includes
the time needed to generate the proper keystream and
perform an XOR operation. The encoder used here is
AN643 Adaptive differential pulse code modulation
(ADPCM). Table 6 shows the timing results for generating
keystream and performing encryption or decryption
process. Each byte of data needs one byte of keystream.
Note that the time needed to decrypt one bSrte is the same
as the time needed to encryTt one byte using either simple
XOR operation or doing XOR operation and applyrng
decoder after that.
Table
From these tests, tlte overall time needed to setup the
system depends on the time needed to take the MFCC
sample and the generation of keys, raking into
consideration their lengths. Table 7 shows the total time
needed to start the system. Note the MFCC audio length is
not included.
4:A tir re needed to in seconds
DH Secret key size Time to prepare DH
key on P 1.7 GHz
Time to prepare DH
key on P 412 MHz
64-bil 0.015625 0.21875
128-bir 0.062s 0.3125
256-bit 0.0937s 0.4375
5t 0. I 562s 0.828125
1024-bit 0.28125 r.53437
able Z: Time in sec( ,nds to sizes from
Key size Time for
MFCC on P 1.7 GHz
Time for
MFCC on P 412
MHz
6/-bit 0.0156 0.0313
128-bit 0.031 I 0. l 563
256-bit 0.328 r 1.1094
5 l2-bil l. I 250 3.5 156
Table 3: Average time needed to generate RSA keys in seconds
RSA key size Time to prepare RSA
keys on P 1.7 GHz
Time to prepare RSA
keys on P 412 MHz
64-bir 0.21875 o.515625
128-bit 0.40625 1.40625
256-bit o.53125 2.359375
5 l2-bit 0.78125 2.76562s
I 024-bit 1.328125 6.093'75
6: Time needed to initialize RC
Operation Time in seconds
on P 1.7 GHz
Tinre in seconds
onP 412
MEz
XOR(1-byte) 0.00001 0.00003
Encode & XOR (l-byte) 0.00007 0.00015
XoR(2-ble) 0.q)002 | 0.m0M
Encode & XOR (2-byte) 0.00015 0.0003
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Table Time to the
Key size Time needed
on P 1.7 GHz
Time needed
on P 412 MHz
6+bit 0.266175 0.802575
128-bit 0.5 1605 t.9l r95
256-bit 0.9693 3.943175
5 tz-bit 2.0't87 7.14625
1024-bit 2.95A575 12.58062
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These results show that a 64-bit system requires less
than one second to prepare the keys after storing the
MFCC audio sample. A 128-bit also requires less than one
second for normal PC and less than two seconds on the
mobile phone simulated processor. The drawback of this
protocol is that it needs a few seconds to take the user's
voice and setup the cryptographic keys, but this can be
solved by encrypting the first seconds with a fixed key
known between users until the system initializes. Note that
the results obtained here using arc 44,100 kHz PCM with
16 bit stereo wave format. Meanwhile, the GSM uses
much less wave quality format which can reduce the
system setup time to the half of these results, meaning that
recent mobile phones can nrn the system in a much fast
manner.
7. Conclusion
This paper discusses t}te development of a system
combining audio Feature Extraction and public key
cryptography. For Feature Exffaction, Mel-Frequency
Cepstrum Coeffrcients was selected due to the fast process,
the quality of the results and it is applicable to any spoken
word. MFCC performs these signal processing steps:
Frame blocking, Windowing, Fast Fourier Transform,
Cepstnrm and Mel-frequency wrapping. In this paper, in
order to perform authentication, MFCC was implemented
to authenticate others by generating a key from the user's
voice.
Both RSA and DH are used to generate the secret
shared key. This key is furtherused as an RC4 key. RC4 is
a fast algorithm to generate keystream and it is suitable for
real-time applications. RSA algorithm generates public
keys which are used to secure the exchange process ofDH
public keys. It is secure to exchange DH public keys
without encryption but exchanging them this way gives
additional security for the proposed method. Overall, the
results for this project are as follows:
(i) Key authentication is done implicitly and
automatically using MFCC feature extaction.(ii) The generated key is secure against the man-in-the-
middle attack.
(iii) The protocol is based on RSA, DH and RC4
cryptosystems.
(iv) Using pseudo-random numbers for the private keys
and the session keys. Also using pseudorandom
number generator for the key streams. These keys are
non-deterministic.
The time required to setup the keys is fast enough for both
PC and mobile phone usage. Also the protocol requires a
very small storage.
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